

# Turing Undecidability and the Efficient Market Hypothesis

**Abstract:** The use of computers to simulate financial markets is commonplace and well understood. This preliminary study examines the reverse relationship: the use of financial markets to simulate computers. Turing undecidability (the computer analogue of Godel's incompleteness theorem) has unexpected implications on the mathematical validity of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH).

## Fundamental Problem

Let's say I write a contract:

*"I hereby promise to pay the bearer of this note \$1000 one year from today."*

This is, of course, a bond; and if I sell this on an open market I can expect to get \$1000 minus the interest.

But what happens if I write the contract as follows:

*"I hereby promise to pay the bearer of this note \$500 plus \$500 one year from today."*

I should expect that this note would sell for the same amount as the previous note. Indeed, the Efficient Market Hypothesis demands it; otherwise, someone could make a pure arbitrage profit by buying the cheaper and selling the dearer.

Of course, I need not restrict myself to addition; I could substitute any mathematical function or computer program. In particular, I can write a contract as follows:

*"I promise to pay the bearer of this note the output of Turing machine X one year from today, where Turing machine X is the following: ..."*

**The Efficient Market Hypothesis guarantees that this contract is priced perfectly and instantaneously, which means that the market has simulated Turing machine X and instantaneously determined its output.**

Theoretical computer scientists ought to hear alarm bells ringing now; an efficient market can do something that no Turing machine can do: determine the output of a Turing machine. For example, let's say that the market uses algorithm P to price securities:

market price = P(security)

Then what happens if you write a contract where Turing machine X is:

$X = P(\text{self}) + \$1$

That is, Turing machine X runs the pricing algorithm on the security, and adds a dollar to the result. This means that either P gives the wrong market price, or P fails to give an answer.

The logic behind this is similar to the the ancient paradox:

1. The following sentence is true.
2. The previous sentence is false.

## **Godel Variations**

Let's say I have two very large prime numbers, X and Y. I multiply them together to get Z ( $Z = X Y$ ). Now I write a contract, saying:

*"I promise to pay the bearer of this note \$1000 if Z is prime, but \$0 if Z is not prime."*

The strong form of EMH says that no inside knowledge (in this case, the primality of Z) will help the investor to make profits. So, the market has done a factorization of Z instantaneously.

We can generalize the above example. For instance, I can write a contract saying:

*I promise to pay the bearer of this note \$1000 if Fermat's Last Theorem is true.*

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Last updated 11/27/2005 12:04:51 AM